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THE LOUISIANA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: AN ANALYSIS
The Louisiana legislature, through the enactment of the Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law,' has injected new life
into two previously exiguous fields of Louisiana law. The Act aids the
consumer who has been at the mercy of unscrupulous merchants
partly due to the disparities in bargaining power and simultaneously
gives businessmen a potent weapon for use against unfair competition
by other businessmen.
The Act makes unlawful all unfair or deceptive trade practices
or methods of competition.2 The legislation is designed to afford re-
dress to any party harmed by such conduct, whether the injured
claimant is categorized as a "consumer" or "businessman." The nar-
row definition of "consumer transaction" which appears at the onset
of the Act:' has no significant effect on the broad proscription of un-
lawful conduct nor on the remedies provided for parties injured
thereby.4
1. LA. R.S. 51:1401-18 (Supp. 1972). See generally Breeden and Lovett,
Louisiana's New Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law, 20 LA. B.J. 307
(1973); Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724 (1972);
CRIMINAL JUSTICE NEWSLETTER, Feb., 1973.
2. LA. R.S. 51:1405(A) (Supp. 1972).
3. R.S. 51:1402(4) defines the term as "[ainy transaction involving trade or
commerce to a natural person, the subject of which transaction is primarily intended
for personal, family or household use."
4. The term "consumer transaction" appears only at section 1418 of the Act,
which is entitled "Jurisdiction." Not only does the narrow definition of consumer
transaction leave unfettered the broad proscriptions and remedies of the Act, but the
section wherein it is found contributes nothing to the jurisdiction of Louisiana courts.
State courts, by operation of R.S. 13:3201(a) already have jurisdiction over any non-
resident who transacts any business in the state. However, the Act, presumably aspir-
ing to circumvent definitional disputes declares that a consumer transaction transpires
in Louisiana in either of two situations: (1) when a document signed by a consumer is
received by a merchant in the state; (2) when the merchant negotiates in the state for
a transaction consummated outside of the state. It is difficult to fashion a situation
whereby this provision expands the long arm jurisdiction. See Breeden and Lovett,
Louisiana's New Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Lau), 20 LA. B.J. 307
(1973). Moreover, this definition must still withstand the constitutional test of mini-
mum contacts." See generally McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957); International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Comment, 26 LA. L.
REv. 350 (1966). Further the words "in the state" are not qualified and can be inter-
preted to mean resident, domiciliary, citizen, or physical location at the time of the
occurrence.
The Act provides at section 1418(B) that all other provisions notwithstanding, the
Act applies if the consumer is a resident of the state at the time of the consumer
transaction and either of the provisions lof section 1418(A)i are applicable. One
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Two different methods of attacking unlawful conduct are pro-
vided in the Act. The state can initiate action for injunctive relief
against a party whose conduct is deemed to be an unfair trade prac-
tice, ' and the court, in such an action, can order that any injured
party be returned to the status quo ante.6 In addition, a private cause
of action is created by the Act and recovery may be actual or treble
damages, including attorney's fees and court costs.7
Unfair Trade Practices
Section 1405(A) is perhaps the most consequential portion of the
legislation.' It provides that "[u]nfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared unlawful."' Further elaboration on the
concept of "unlawful conduct" is not found within the Act, but this
omission may be one of the more laudible aspects of the legislation.
Other states have attempted to expressly enumerate unlawful prac-
possible interpretation of this provision is that the Act constitutes an exclusive remedy
if a consumer transaction is involved, i.e., to the exclusion of other actions, such as
redhibition. The more logical interpretation is that section 1418(B) merely adds to the
extraneous provisions of section 1418(A). If the former interpretation is obtained, then
section 1418(B) is subject to the same constitutional infirmity as is section 1418(C)
which declares inter alia that all consumer transactions, wherein it is agreed that
jurisdiction and venue shall be in another state, are null and void. Article Il, section
16 of the Louisiana constitution requires that the title to a section generally direct
attention to the purposes of the law. The title to section 1418 ("Jurisdiction") hardly
does that. The jurisprudence is to the effect that while the title need not index the
contents of the section, if it is misleading or the variance is palpable or totally irrecon-
cilable with the contents, then the statute is unconstitutional. See State v. Sliger, 261
La. 999, 261 So. 2d 643 (1972); Parish of Jefferson v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections,
259 La. 1063, 254 So. 2d 582 (1971); Associated Gen. Cont. of America v. Police Jury,
225 So. 2d 300 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Comment, 6 LA. L. REv. 72 (1944).
5. LA. R.S. 51:1407 (Supp. 1972).
6. Id. 51:1408 (Supp. 1972).
7. Id. 51:1409 (Supp. 1972). The mere existence of this broad spectrum of onerous
remedies should serve as a deterrent. The qualitative aspects of this consideration are
advanced in Reed, Legislating for the Consumer, 2 PAC. L.J. 1 (1971).
8. The constitutionality of the statute is currently being tested on the grounds
that section 1405(A) is vague, but no decision is reported as of the time of this writing.
However, the Supreme Court of Colorado upheld the Colorado Consumer Protection
Act [CoLo. REv. STAT. 55-5-1 through 55-5-13 (1969 Perm. Supp.)], which is quite
similar to the Louisiana Act. See People ex rel. Dunbar v. Gym of America, Inc., 493
P.2d 660 (Colo. 1972).
9. LA. R.S. 51:1405(A) (Supp. 1972). It should be pointed out that this terminol-
ogy has been extensively interpreted. One prevailing theme is that an unfair trade
practice may include, but it is not limited to, that which the courts call fraud. See
FTC v. Algoma Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934). There the Court also held that the fact
that another company has adopted an unfair trade practice is not a defense.
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tices, but as a result of an inability to foresee every possible unfair
practice, such acts have been circumvented and their effectiveness
negated.' On the other hand, acts similar to Louisiana's, modeled
after section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA)" have
resulted in a more comprehensive attack on unfair trade practices
because of the broad and flexible nature of those laws.2
The question then arises whether the federal jurisprudence con-
cerning the FTCA is incorporated in the Louisiana Act." Several
factors strongly point to an affirmative conclusion. First, section
1405(A) of the Louisiana Act and section 5(a)(1) of the FTCA are
virtually identical.' The Louisiana rule of statutory construction is
that the adoption of a statute of the federal government or of another
state includes all of the previous authoritative interpretations and
constructions of that statute. 'I Secondly, the Louisiana Act exempts
from coverage all conduct which complies with section 5(a)(1) of the
FTCA. " Therefore, practices which contravene section 5(a)(1) of the
FTCA could logically be viewed as violations of the Louisiana Act.
This exemption, read in pari materia with section 1405(A) of the
Louisiana Act, is indicative of the legislative intent to adopt the
10. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Baker and Baum, Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 VILL. L.
REV. 517 (1962); Comment, 48 N.C.L. REV. 896 (1970).
11. 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (1970).
12. Breeden and Lovett, Louisiana's New Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer
Protection Law, 20 LA. B.J. 307 (1973); CRIMINAL JUSTICE NEWSLETTER, Feb., 1973.
13. Id. For an analysis of the legislative and judicial history of section 5 of the
F.T.C.A. see FTC v. Keppel and Bro., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); Note, 47 TUL. L. REV. 436
(1973); Baker and Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continu-
ing Process of Redefinition, 7 VILL. L. REV. 517 (1962).
14. LA. R.S. 51:1405(A) (Supp. 1972): "Unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1) (1970): "Unfair methods of competition in
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlaw-
ful." The only significant difference is that Louisiana's Act extends to trade as well as
commerce.
15. State v. Macaluso, 235 La. 1019, 106 So. 2d 455 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v.
Collector of Revenue, 210 La. 428, 27 So. 2d 268 (1946); Burris v. Guest House of
Opelousas, Inc., 195 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Broussard v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 188 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 713, 190
So. 2d 233 (1966); State v. Baddock, 170 So. 2d 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Cooper v.
Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1923); Succession of Hedden, 140 So. 851
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932).
A recent case casts doubts upon this line of jurisprudence. L.A. Frey & Sons v.
Lafayette Par. Sch. Bd., 262 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972) (failed to apply the
rule of the Standard Oil case). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1971-1972 Term-State and Local Taxation, 33 LA. L. REV. 289, 293 (1973).
16. LA. R.S. 51:1406(4) (Supp. 1972).
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FTCA interpretations, as opposed to merely adopting as an exemp-
tion that which is permissible by FTCA standards. Furthermore,
total ambiguity as to what constitutes an unfair trade practice would
preclude its use as a guideline for business. If the sixty years of Fed-
eral Trade Commission experience are employed, attorneys can more
readily advise business as to what constitutes unlawful conduct. 7
Interpreting section 1405(A) in this manner would in no way limit the
Louisiana Act, but rather would serve as a solid base from which to
expand.
Administration
The legislature has placed the responsibility of administering the
Act in four different bodies of state government, two of which were
created by the Act. The two main offices are the Governor's Con-
sumer Protection Division'" (CPD) and the Consumer Protection Di-
vision of the Attorney General's Office 9 (Attorney General).
The CPD is the mainstay of the administration of the statute.
One of its activities is to conduct public hearings2 ' to determine the
existence of unlawful actions,2' to formulate rules and regulations to
preclude future violations, and to clarify the ambiguities inherent in
section 1405(A).12 Regulations are drawn by the Director of the CPD13
and must be approved by the Permanent Consumer Advisory Board
17. Comment, 48 N.C.L. REV. 896, 910 (1970).
18. The Governor's Consumer Protection Division is created in R.S. 51:1403 and
its powers are delineated in R.S. 51:1404. The other two state bodies are the Permanent
Consumer Advisory Board (see note 24 infra) and the local District Attorneys.
19. The mandate from the legislature to the Attorney General is not found in any
particular section of the Act, but is rather contained in numerous references through-
out the Act. Two potential problems are created by the statute. First, recognition of
the potential political conflict between two administrative bodies is cause for some
concern in that efficient administration of the Act is contingent on cooperation of the
two offices. Another problem is the source of funding of the two new bodies. Both will
be involved in areas sensitive to political considerations, and it is from the legislature
that the agencies must receive finances. The provisions enabling them to seek federal
funds can obviate this dependence to a certain extent, and as a matter of fact, that is
the current mainstay of the budget of both operations.
20. LA. R.S. 51:1404(A)(1)(a) (Supp. 1972).
21. Id. 51:1404(B) (Supp. 1972).
22. Id. 51:1405(B) (Supp. 1972).
23. The regulations must be consistent with R.S. 51:1461.1, which deal with trade
and commerce. This provision in the Act was apparently included to insure that the
regulations do not conflict with provisions previously governing business relations.
19741
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
(Board)"' and the Attorney General, before adoption. ' To be consis-
tent with state policy regarding the functions of administrative agen-
cies, these regulations must not set forth affirmative conduct, but
must merely define what conduct is proscribed by the legislation. 2"
To guard against the abuse of this rule-making power, the Act estab-
lishes a procedure whereby the validity of such regulations may be
ascertained by declaratory judgment.27
The CPD and the Attorney General are also involved in the
private actions brought under the Act. All plaintiffs are required to
give notice of initiation of litigation to the two state bodies and, upon
entry of a judgment or decree, plaintiffs must mail a copy thereof to
the CPD and Attorney General.2" Presumably, one reason for these
provisions is to facilitate the offices' efforts in coordinating develop-
ments under the statute. Moreover, if the conduct of which the plain-
24. LA. R.S. 51:1405(C) (Supp. 1972). The Permanent Consumer Advisory Board
(Board) is created by the Act. Its seventeen members are appointed by the Governor
upon recommendations by a number of non-governmental state organizations. A close
examination of the membership reveals that less than a majority are demonstrably
consumer-oriented. The chief functions of the Board are to make recommendations to
the CPD concerning administration of the Act and to approve the rules and regulations
proposed pursuant to 51:1405(B). The public hearings of the CPD, required by R.S.
51:1404(A)(1)(a), generally transpire before the Board, but this is not required by the
Act. The By-Laws of the Governor's Office of Consumer Protection, section II(D),
require that the Director be present at all meetings of the Board; however, this is not
specified in the Act, thus the binding effect is questionable.
25. R.S. 51:1405(B) provides that the rules and regulations must be adopted in
the form and manner prescribed by R.S. 49:951-968, which is the chapter setting forth
administrative procedure to be followed by state agencies. Two regulations have al-
ready been adopted. GOVERNOR'S CONSUMER PROTECTION DIviSION, RULES AND REGULA-
TIONS, Tit. 3, ch. II, § 5001, (multi-level distribution and chain distributor marketing
schemes), § 5002 (magazine and periodical subscription sales practices). For an analy-
sis of the attack on "pyramid sales" (section 5001) under section 5 of the FTCA see
Dejute, Myers and Wedding, Wheeler-Lea Versus Pyramidal Sales, 10 AM. Bus. L.J.
207 (1973). These regulations were approved on September 19, 1973 by the Board.
Proposed regulations are section 5003, (disclosures required in the awarding of
prizes or the conduction of demonstration or instruction classes); section 5004, (bait
advertising); section 5005, (mobile home parks); and section 5006, (automotive repairs
and services). Copies of all regulations and proposed regulations may be obtained from
the Secretary of State or from the Governor's Office of Consumer Protection, P.O. Box
44091, Baton Rouge, La. 70804.
26. All regulations should be read subject to the caveat that the legislature cannot
abdicate its authority in favor of an administrative agency without violating the Louis-
iana constitution. LA. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2. See Louisiana St. Bd. of Embalmers v.
Britten, 244 La. 756, 154 So. 2d 389 (1963); Collector of Rev. v. Olvey, 238 La. 980,
117 So. 2d 563 (1960); National Bank of Com. v. Board of Supervisors, 206 La. 913, 20
So. 2d 264 (1944); City of Shreveport v. Price, 142 La. 936, 77 So. 883 (1918).
27. LA. R.S. 51:1405(B) (Supp. 1972).
28. Id. 51:1409(B) (Supp. 1972).
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tiff complains is egregious, the state might be warranted in initiating,
independently of the private action, an action for injunction, pre-
ceded by a temporary restraining order2 ' to provide interim relief.
The Director of the CPD is authorized with the Attorney General
to accept a violator's assurance of voluntary compliance with an order
by the CPD. : ' The Act apparently requires both the Attorney General
and the CPD to agree, and, as a practical matter, that is the current
practice of those two offices. :"
The Attorney General is given the responsibility of investigating
violations :2 (a power shared with the CPD) and instituting an action
for injunctive relief in the name of the state.:' Section 1404(B) de-
clares, "[tihe attorney general may institute legal proceedings."' 4
On the other hand, section 1407 provides "[w]henever the director
and the attorney general have reason to believe. . . the director may
instruct the attorney general to bring an action for injunctive relief."' 35
Only judicial interpretation will resolve the problem of which body
has the power to initiate actions, or to what extent the two bodies
may work independently in that regard.
The Act allows the district attorneys throughout the state to act
"in the same manner as provided for the attorney general."" This
29. All of these actions are authorized by R.S. 51:1407.
30. LA. R.S. 51:1410 (Supp. 1972). For significance of voluntary compliance, see
text at note 58 infra.
31. Interview with Charles Tapp, Director, Governor's Office of Consumer Protec-
tion, in Baton Rouge, La., December, 1973.
32. LA. R.S. 51:1404(B) (Supp. 1972). Broad tools to facilitate investigation and
remedy inadequate investigative staffs are provided at R.S. 51:1411 (Investigative
Demands) and R.S. 51:1412 (Investigative Depositions). The demands are enforceable
by contempt orders as provided by section 1413. These two devices are supplemental
to other devices which the Attorney General is authorized to use by the laws of
Louisiana.
33. LA. R.S. 51:1407 (Supp. 1972). In an analogous situation, the Louisiana su-
preme court ruled that the Attorney General has the inherent and constitutional right
under Article VII, section 56 of the Louisiana Constitution to sue in the state's name
to protect the state's interest, without first obtaining the "permission" of the Governor
or an agency. State v. Texas Co., 199 La. 846, 7 So.2d 161 (1942); on remand, 205 La.
517, 17 So. 2d 569 (1944). The legislature had created a Mineral Board and given the
board the power to sue, but that fact did not preclude the Attorney General from
bringing suit on a matter within the province of the Mineral Board. If this reasoning
is followed, it is likely that the Attorney General can initiate suit under the Act without
regard to any action of the CPD.
34. LA. R.S. 51:1404(B) (Supp. 1972).
35. Id. 51:1407. However, the Attorney General can initiate similar actions under
the general authority provided by R.S. 15:5036. Moreover, it is at least arguable that
the "necessary and proper clause" of R.S. 51:1404(A) (6) would enable the legal section
of the CPD to initiate such an action.
36. LA. R.S. 51:1417 (Supp. 1972): "District Attorneys and their assistants . . .
may institute and prosecute actions hereunder in the same manner as provided for the
Attorney General. In such cases, full reports shall be made to the Attorney General
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creates 64 additional enforcers of the Act, thus enabling the Attorney
General's office to devote its time to the more flagrant state-wide
violations. It is uncertain from a reading of the statute whether the
broad investigative powers conferred on the Attorney General are
likewise, by operation of section 1417, granted to the district attor-
neys. 7
Exemptions from Coverage
Four exemptions from coverage are provided for by the Act."
1. Distributors of products who use promotional material which
is unfair or deceptive are exempt from coverage if the material is
prepared by the manufacturer for use by its distributors and if the
distributor cooperates with the Attorney General in investigation of
the manufacturer, and if the distributor gives assurances of voluntary
compliance as provided for in the Act." This exemption, unlike the
other three granted by the Act," in no way affects an individual's
private action," except of course, that the rules concerning voluntary
compliance must be followed.2 Hence, only action by the state is
barred by compliance with this provision.
2. All actions or transactions subject to the jurisdiction of other
enumerated state regulatory agencies are exempted from the Act."'
These areas are generally covered by the statutes creating the listed
and Director including final disposition of the matter." At the time of this writing,
there is no reported action under this provision.
However, the same uncertainty as to whether the CPD and Attorney General must
act concurrently, might create problems; i.e, it is possible that the CPD must act with
the district attorneys.
37. See note 32 supra.
38. LA. R.S. 51:1406 (Supp. 1972).
39. Id. 51:1406(3) (Supp. 1972). From the wording of the statute, it would appear
that all three enumerated elements are necessary for a party to come within the terms
of the statute.
40. The other three exemptions provided for R.S. 51:1406 make no reference to
private action: it should then follow that, since the legislature was silent as to them,
private and state action under the statute are barred by "fitting into" one of the other
three exemptions.
41. The pertinent language of R.S. 51:1406(3) reads, "This exemption does not in
any way limit the right of action any consumer may have under this Chapter."
42. While section 1406(3) does not refer to the section dealing with assurances of
voluntary compliance (section 1410), it seems clear that an assurance given by a party
to bring him within the exemption of section 1406(3) would still not be considered an
admission of violation. If nothing else, section 1410 follows section 1406 and hence
modifies and is paramount thereto.
43. LA. R.S. 51:1406(1) (Supp. 1972) (e.g.: The Louisiana Public Service Commis-
sion, State Bank Commission, State Insurance Commission).
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agencies or the new Consumer Credit Law.44
3. The advertising media is exempt if the medium involved did
not have knowledge of the false, misleading, or deceptive character
of the advertisement, did not prepare the advertisement, and had no
direct financial interest in the sale or distribution of the advertised
products."' The absence of any of these elements apparently removes
the medium from the exemption.' A finding that the exemption does
not apply would seem tantamount to a finding of an unfair practice
in that the enumerated elements seem to set forth a standard of
conduct for the media.
4. The broadest exemption is "any conduct which complies
with Section 5(a)(1) of the FTCA . . ., any rule promulgated pur-
suant thereto and any finally adjudicated court decision interpreting
the provisions of said Act, rules and regulations."' 7 It would be specu-
lation to predict how the courts will define "finally adjudicated," but
it should be pointed out that an interpretation which permits varying
authority will operate detrimentally to the goals of the Act by inject-
ing uncertainty and thereby diminish its value as a deterrent or as a
guideline.
Remedies
The statute creates two separate causes of action: one to be insti-
tuted by the state,4" and one to be instituted by the private individual
who claims to have been wronged."' When the Director and the Attor-
ney General have reason to believe that a person5 ' is engaged in an
unlawful act, action for injunction may be brought against the of-
fender in the name of the state."' In that case, there is no requirement
44. Id. 9:3510-3568 (Supp. 1972).
45. Id. 51:1406(2) (Emphasis added.)
46. LA. R.S. 51:1406(2) (Supp. 1972): "Acts done ... when the publisher. . . did
not have knowledge of the false .. .character of the advertisement, did not prepare
the advertisement and did not have any direct financial interest . (Emphasis
added.)
47. Id. 51:1406(4) (Supp. 1972).
48. Id. 51:1407, 1408 (Supp. 1972).
49. Id. 51:1409 (Supp. 1972). Special jurisdictional provisions are created by the
Act. See note 4 supra.
50. "Person" is defined broadly at R.S. 51:1402(9) to mean "a natural person,
corporation, trust, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association, and any
other legal entity."
51. R.S. 51:1407, in addition to authorizing the state action, provides that a court
may issue a temporary restraining order and that the orders and injunctions issued
"shall be issued without bond." (Emphasis added.) Because the statute authorizes the
state to bring action for injunctive relief, and because injunctive relief is specifically
authorized for private actions only at R.S. 51:1410 (assurance of voluntary compliance
1974]
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that a specific victim of the defendant's unfair trade practice be
named; 5 therefore, the state's evidentiary burden is apparently re-
duced to merely a showing of a violation. However, if it is shown that
there is a party who has been aggrieved, the court may order that the
defendant reimburse him for actual damages sustained, 3 without any
requirement that such a person be a party litigant.54
The defendant in such an action may choose to voluntarily com-
ply 55 with the request of the Attorney General, thereby avoiding fur-
ther litigation, expense and adverse publicity." The assurance of vol-
untary compliance must be accepted by both the Director and Attor-
ney General. Such assurances are drafted concurrently by these two
provisions), it is questionable whether injunctions will lie in any other circumstances,
such as private actions. That is a logical conclusion to draw from the fact that an
individual's remedies are enumerated in the Act and allowing injunctions may not
have been what a politically conscious legislature had in mind.
LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3601: "An injunction shall issue in cases where irreparable
injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result to the applicant, or in other cases specifi-
cally provided by law . (Emphasis added.) It is submitted that R.S. 51:1407
suggests a situation covered by the italicized clause. Therefore, an injunction may be
granted merely upon a showing that a party is engaging or is about to engage in an
unlawful action and that there is no requirement that the state show irreparable harm.
52. LA. R.S. 51:1407 (Supp. 1972) allows injunction if there is reason to believe
that an unlawful event is occurring or is about to occur. Since a contemplated action
inherently has no victim, it would seem that the Act to a certain extent proscribes
thoughts.
53. !d. 51:1408 (Supp. 1972). This provision avoids one common criticism of the
FTCA: the F.T.C. is limited to cease and desist orders and is unable to require mone-
tary redress. But see Sebert, Obtaining Monetary Redress for Consumers Through
Action by the Federal Trade Commission, 57 MINN. L. REv. 225 (1972).
54. LA. R.S. 51:1409 (Supp. 1972) bans class actions: "A person may bring an
action individually but not in a representative capacity. ... it appears however that
proper utilization of R.S. 51:1408 (all wronged parties submit affidavits demonstrating
loss) allows a class action of sorts, brought in the name of the state, but nevertheless
circumventing the section 1409 ban. Hence, while fears of business manifested through
lobbyists may have precluded the legislature from providing for class actions in the
traditional manner, it is still possible for massive numbers of persons to recover actual
damages from a party who has committed an act made unlawful by section 1405(A).
Many criticisms of the class action are avoided, but the deterrent value of large liabil-
ity is incorporated in that Act. For extensive analysis of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of class actions in consumer protection legislation see Note, 8 IDAHo L. REV. 322,
328 (1972); The Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, A Panel Discussion, 27 Bus.
LAWYER 139, 142 (Nov., 1971); Gamin, Regulation of Business Practices for Consumer
Protection, 28 J. Mo. B. 438 (Sept., 1972); Eovaldi and Gostrin, Justice for Consumers:
The Mechanics of Redress, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 281 (1971).
55. LA. R.S. 51:1410 (Supp. 1972).
56. See Note, 8 IDAHo L. REV. 322, 324 (1972).
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state offices, to be submitted to and signed by the offender.5 7 This
assurance does not bar a civil action by a private party,"6 but the
statute provides that it does not constitute "an admission of violation
for any purpose."'
In either situation, whether the party is enjoined or voluntarily
complies, the Act grants that party a cause of action to enjoin com-
peting businessmen engaged in comparable activity."' The Act leaves
open several crucial questions in this area. It would seem that an
assurance of voluntary compliance given by one businessman would
not constitute prima facie evidence of unlawfulness for purposes of
enjoining other competitors. Another dubiety is the binding effect of
the voluntary compliance on the original violator; assuming the de-
fendant in the "secondary action" successfully defends his conduct,
is the original violator still bound by the terms of his compliance?
Additionally, it is not clear whether the voluntary compliance pre-
cludes the court's awarding compensation to aggrieved parties." If
that is not the case, then it would seem to follow that the "secondary
action" against competitors might also entail the possibility of com-
pensation of aggrieved parties.
57. LA. R S. 51: L410 (Supp. 1972). Interview with Charles Tapp, Director, Gover-
nor's Office of Consumer Protection, in Baton Rouge, La., December, 1973.
58. LA. R.S. 51:1410 (Supp. 1972) merely provides that there shall be assurances
of voluntary compliance and dictates the filing procedure. Nowhere in the Act is the
effect given, but the last sentence of section 1410 reads, "[sluch assurance of volun-
tary compliance shall not be considered an admission of violation for any purpose."
The legislature obviously envisioned some other action wherein the assurance would
be valuable evidence if not excluded. The action in question apparently is a private
civil action under R.S. 51:1409. Moreover, the provision read in pari materia demands
the conclusion that the state cannot preclude a plaintiff's suit for actual damages
sustained merely because-the defendant has apologized and promised to be good in the
future. Were that the construction, then a serious due process challenge would lie.
59. Notice that the last sentence of R.S. 51:1410 states that the assurance does
not constitute "an admission of violation for any purpose." (Emphasis added.) This is
distinguished from stating that "the assurance does not constitute an admission."
Hence it is arguable that the assurance can be introduced in a trial under the "admis-
sion" exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule for any purpose other than an admis-
sion of violation such as to show a pre-existing condition, or knowledge of defendant
of a standard of care. This construction would effectively eviscerate the provision and
would seemingly be contrary to the public policy behind the provision (saving of time
and expense of trial by the business voluntarily rectifying an unlawful situation).
60. LA. R.S. 51:1409(D) (Supp. 1972).
61. R.S. 51:1408 allows compensation of parties actually injured as an aspect of
the state's action. It is noted that the Act provides no procedural device to implement
those restitution orders. This creates additional inquiries. For example, what kind of
right does an aggrieved party obtain once the court has ordered that he be reimbursed,
and how can he satisfy that right?
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A civil penalty of $5,000 per violation is provided for non-
compliance with an injunctive order or refusal to compensate ag-
grieved parties."2 It is conceivable that the court will rule that each
day of refusal constitutes a separate violation. Such an interpretation
would certainly strengthen the incentive to follow the directives of the
court. "
The Act also creates a private cause of action, to be initiated
within one year of the transaction or act giving rise to this action,"4
for any person who suffers ascertainable loss as the result of another's
unfair or deceptive trade practice."' The coverage is quite broad be-
cause "person" is defined so as to include corporate and other legal
entities as well as natural persons" All successful plaintiffs recover
at least actual damages, but it is possible to further recover treble
damages, attorney's fees and court costs.
The Act declares that "[i]n the event damages are awarded
under this section, the court shall award to the person bringing such
action reasonable attorney's fees and costs.""7 Since the word "dam-
ages" is in no way qualified, it would seem that recovery, be it actual
or treble, results in a mandatory awarding of those fees. To preclude
frivolous utilization of the Act, section 1409(A) declares,
[ulpon a finding by the court that an action under this section
62. LA. R.S. 51:1416 (Supp. 1972).
63. The statute makes no provision for, but does not rule out the possibility of,
issuance of contempt orders.
64. LA. R.S. 51:1409(E) (Supp. 1972). The statute provides no prescriptive period
for initiation of state action, but that is understandable in that the state's action is
for injunction which naturally presupposes a violation which exists at the time of the
litigation. Moreover, R.S. 51:1408 read with R.S. 51:1407 can be interpreted to require
that a party request compensation concurrently with the state's action for injunction.
The problem is illustrated by this hypothet: Business has been involved in a practice
for two years. Customer was damaged two years ago, but took no action. State sues
Business for injunction. Customer's claim for damages under section 1409 is pre-
scribed, but Customer may seek compensation under section 1408. In effect then,
Customer's action never prescribes and he can always obtain actual damages, provid-
ing State institutes proceedings for an injunction.
65. LA. R.S 51:1409(A) (Supp. 1972). A provision of this nature in the South
Carolina Consumer Protection Law was praised because it frees the attorney general
to deal with the larger, more organized deceptive practices which the consumer would
find difficult to challenge. Note, 22 S.C. L. REV. 767 (1970).
66. LA. R.S. 51:1402(9) (Supp. 1972). Nor is the Act subject to the most prevalent
criticism of the FTCA: that the F.T.C. has jurisdiction over matters "in commerce"
rather than "affecting commerce." See Gamm, Regulation of Business Practices for
Consumer Protection, 28 J. Mo. B. 438 (1972); Note, 22 S.C. L. REV. 767 (1970). Even
the Louisiana definition of "consumer transaction" at section 1402(4) uses the lan-
guage "involving trade or commerce" rather than "in commerce."
67. LA. R.S. 51:1409(A) (Supp. 1972).
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was groundless and brought in bad faith or for purposes of bar-
rassment, the court may award to the defendant reasonable attor-
ney's fees and costs."
The portion of the Act dealing with treble damages is perhaps
the most problematic. This provision states that
[i]f the court finds the unfair or deceptive method, act or prac-
tice Was knowingly used, after being put on notice by the director
or attorney general, the court shall award three times the actual
damages sustained."9
Part of the problem revolves around the meaning of the clause, "after
being put on notice." A literal interpretation would seem to require
the Attorney General or Director to notify the court before it could
award treble damages. However, the more probable meaning of the
phrase is that if the offender is notified by either of these state offi-
cials and nevertheless continues his activity, then the court can
award treble damages.' Presumably, once the offender is notified by
the state that a specific practice is in contravention of the statute,
then any party who thereafter suffers loss by the offender's continua-
tion of that practice should be awarded treble damages. One wonders
however, to what extent a slight modification of the practice may
vitiate the effect of the original notification."
Interpreting the Act to make notice a prerequisite to recovery of
treble damages leaves several provisions of the Act without meaning.
Most significant is the requirement of a "knowing violation." "Know-
ingly" is defined by the Act to mean that "the act or practice used
was such that a reasonably prudent businessman knew or should
have known that the act or practice was in violation of this
68. Id. 51:1409(A) (Supp. 1972).
69. Id. 51:1409(A) (Supp. 1972) (Emphasis added.) This provision is subject to
constitutional attack on the grounds that the substance is broader than the title. The
title reads "Private Action," but the interjection of the state into the action (treble
damages provision) is certainly not indicated by the title. See note 65 supra.
70. The Preamble to the Act reads, "[T]o provide for private actions to redover
(sic) actual damages and recovery of attorney's fees and costs, and for treble damages
where the court finds the knowing use, after notice, of a prohibited act." The commas
here do not appear to have been correctly placed either.
71. For example, an offender is notified that his practice of advertising one com-
modity to attract customers followed by the disparagement of that commodity for the
purpose of encouraging the sale of a more expensive good, is in violation of the Act.
After the notice, the offender advertises in the same manner, but when the customer
enters the store, he is informed that the business is "out" of the advertised good. Both
practices are variations of "bait and switch" (see note 25 supra) but the defendant was
put on notice only as to the first.
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Chapter."7 The apparent function of this provision is to vary the
damages according to the flagrancy of the violation; thus the offender
who intentionally violates the Act should be held "more liable" than
one who inadvertently violates the Act."' This result does not obtain
because the Act further requires notification by the CPD or Attorney
General as a prerequisite for recovery of treble damages. Hence, a
businessman who was found to have intentionally violated the Act,
but who was not put on notice by the state, would be liable only for
actual damages. Moreover, it would seem that in virtually every in-
stance, notice by the CPD or Attorney General would constitute
"knowledge" for purposes of the first requirement. Therefore, while
the Act seems to set forth two separate requirements for treble dam-
ages, it has actually blurred the two and made them one. Since notice
is required for recovery of treble damages, there is no reason for the
provision requiring "knowledge." It follows that the provision which
states that violation of a permanent injunction is prima facie evi-
dence of knowledge"4 is also inconsequential.
The Act creates no standards by which to gauge the advisability
of sending notice; the wisdom of allowing a state official, acting with-
out guidelines, to determine whether a plaintiff will recover actual or
treble damages, must be questioned. Similarly, this procedure seems
to accord new weight to opinions of state officials which have pre-
viously been merely persuasive. 5
The better approach would be that notice by the state official
72. LA. R.S. 51:1402(11) (Supp. 1972).
73. Theoretically, the lawmakers desired to make the amount of damages increase
in proportion to the degree of wrongdoing. Compare however, these three hypothetical
violators' liability.
A uses a method of advertising which the court rules to be deceptive. A
demonstrates that his violation was inadvertent and is therefore liable only for actual
damages, attorney's fees, and court costs.
B uses a method of advertising which he believed was lawful. He was notified by
the CPD that his act was unlawful, but B's attorney, finding no support for the CPD
opinion, advised B to ignore the CPD as constituting only an opinion. B is held by the
court to have used a method which the reasonable businessman "should have known"
was unlawful, and since he was "warned by the CPD," B must pay treble damages,
attorney's fees and court costs.
C uses a method of advertising which is intended to defraud the consumer, thereby
"knowingly" and "intentionally" violates the statute. C is not however notified by the
CPD and hence will be liable in the same amount as A, the inadvertent violator, and
less than B, another inadvertent violator.
74. LA. R.S. 51:1409(C) (Supp. 1972).
75. The general attitude of the courts seems to be that little judicial significance
should be accorded Opinions of the Attorney General. See, e.g., Labit v. Terrebonne,
49 So. 2d 431, 434 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950).
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merely constitutes one method of putting the offender into the
"knowing violator" category. Knowledge would be proven by demon-
strating that the offender ignored notification or that he knew or
should have known that his practice was in contravention of the Act.
This would remove the objectionable aspect of state control over the
private cause of action because while the court must still find a viola-
tion in fact, it need not make treble damages contingent on the state's
notification. Coordination of state policy objectives would still be
allowed in that if the state deemed the offender's action particularly
outrageous, the state could reduce the plaintiff's evidentiary burden
by putting the party on notice, and thereby encourage the defendant
to immediately terminate the objectionable practice. Therefore, to
effectuate optimum realization of the objectives of the Act, the stat-
ute should be amended to require only a knowing violation of the Act
in order to recover treble damages and to provide that continued
practice after notification by the state constitutes a presumption of
knowledge.
James E. Boren
